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The Philosophies of the Common Law and their Implications:
Common Law Divergences, Public Authority Liability, and the
Future of a Common Law World
Dan Priel*
Forthcoming in The Common Law of Obligations: Divergence and Unity
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, Andrew Robertson & Michael Tilbury eds., 2015)

Prologue
Following the economic crisis of the last few years, John Maynard Keynes has once again assumed centre-stage.1 In this essay I am not going to speak about Keynes’s economic ideas, but
will attempt to say something about the significance he accorded to ideas. In the concluding
paragraphs of his General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money Keynes famously wrote
that ‘the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when
they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled
by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual
influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist….I am sure that the power of
vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas’.2
Keynes alludes in these brief remarks to a longstanding debate among historians and philosophers of history on the relative significance of ideas and interests.3 In this essay I will explore
the influence of ideas on the common law. I will attempt to show that different answers to a
philosophical question on the authority of the common law have very practical implications
to the question of the relevance of convergence and divergence between different legal systems. Even more contentiously, I will argue that these philosophical debates have implications
to substantive questions of tort law. In both domains, we cannot make complete sense of the
debate and have no basis for choosing one answer over another without attending to underlying ideologies. Even lawyers who believe themselves to be engaged in ‘practical’ scholarship,
seeking to account for the law as found in the case and base whatever normative suggestions
they make on nothing more than the idea that like cases be treated alike,4 should not ignore
the significance of these ideas.
*
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For a comprehensive survey see ‘2008–09 Keynesian Resurgence’ in Wikipedia, available at http://
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2
John Maynard Keynes, A General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (London: Macmillan, 1936)
383.
3
See e.g. Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 101–08.
4
See e.g., Andrew Burrows, Understanding the Law of Obligations: Essays on Contract, Tort and Restitution
(Oxford: Hart, 1998) 108, 118–19, 127; Andrew Burrows, ‘The Influence of Comparative Law on the English Law of
Obligations’ (this volume) MS at 1, 29. On the question-begging nature of treating like cases alike see Dan Priel,
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I. The Puzzle of the Authority of the Common Law
For all the talk about the decline of the state, the rise of supranational legal regimes, and the
growing significance of foreign, transnational, and international law, much law is still tethered
to nation states. And many who have thought about the matter have argued that within limits, states have legitimate authority to make laws that apply to the people who live within their
boundaries. These days such accounts typically connect the authority to make laws to democracy. How exactly this link is to be drawn is, of course, a contested question, but no matter
how one wishes to fill in the details, they do not seem to fit the common law particularly well.
First, the principal lawmakers in the common law are judges, who are typically unelected and
unrepresentative. If the authority of law depends on its democratic credentials, then the
common law seems to flout this requirement. Second and related, the common law seems to
transcend state or other political boundaries, while tying together legal systems that sometimes have no political links to each other, and are geographically (and perhaps in other ways)
far apart.
This puzzle can be presented in the following, very rough, syllogism:
(1) The (legitimate) authority of law derives from the authority of the state.
(2) The (legitimate) authority of the state derives from having democratic institutions.
(3) The common law is undemocratic.
Hence, (4) the authority of the common law looks suspect.
As presented, this syllogism is not meant to be an air-tight deductive argument, as its premises
are very vaguely phrased. Nonetheless, it is helpful for presenting the problem of what I will
call the puzzle of the authority of the common law, as well as for outlining possible answers to
it. I will distinguish between three positions that can be placed on a spectrum that has complete legal localism at one end and legal universalism at the other. The first approach I will
consider answers the puzzle by rejecting premise (3). Thus, this approach solves the puzzle of
the common law’s authority by explaining it away. It seeks to subsume the authority of the
common law within a broader account of democratic authority. The second approach rejects
premise (1). This view asserts, in effect, that the error in this argument is the thought that the
authority of law derives from the state. On this view, the authority of law derives from its content, from the correspondence of laws to an external standard—say, morality or natural law.
So understood, even if the authority of the state is derived from maintaining democratic institutions, the authority of law (or at least the authority of the common law) is independent of
those institutions. In fact, even the authority of democratic institutions on this view is derived
from deeper moral principles. The third approach focuses on premise (2). At its strongest, this
view seeks the authority of the state in the idea of a political tradition, which it sees as more
Review of Lloyd Weinreb, Legal Reason: The Use of Analogy in Legal Argument, (2008) 57 Journal of Legal Education
579, 580–82; Charlie Webb, ‘Treating Like Cases Alike: Principle and Classification in Private Law’ in Andrew
Robertson & Tang Hang Wu (eds), The Goals of Private Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009) 215, 227–28.
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foundational than democracy. Though this view can be stated generally, in its legal incarnation, its proponents do not deny that the authority of some law is derived from the authority
of the state, but they reject the idea that this is true of the authority of all law. Specifically,
proponents of this typically view draw a sharp distinction between statute law, for which they
think something like the syllogism is true, and common law, whose authority, they argue, is
grounded in tradition.
What do these debates in political philosophy have to do with the concern of ‘practical
lawyers’ about divergences in the common law? As I will try to demonstrate, quite a lot. The
first view lends itself to the idea that convergence among common law countries is, if it happens, an interesting empirical finding, but it rejects outright the view that sees convergence as
a normative ideal. The second view also rejects the ideal of common law convergence; but it
does so in a very different way. The second view implies an ideal of universal convergence, one
in which divergences among common law jurisdictions are no more problematic than divergence between common law and non-common law jurisdictions. It is only the third approach
that fits the view (quite popular in certain circles) that common law jurisdictions, and only
common law jurisdictions, ought to aim for convergence. To many who study the laws of
contract, tort, property, trusts and so on—those areas of law sometimes simply called ‘the
common law’—talk of English, Canadian, or Australian common law is in some sense misleading. Ultimately, they will say, there really is just one common law. More than a description of reality, this is thought to be a normative claim: Divergences between (say) English and
Australian law are a cause for concern, while divergences between (say) English and French
law are not. 5
In what follows I attempt to further explain the theoretical presuppositions of these
competing approaches. I will first try to substantiate my claim that the different attitudes to
the question of authority relate to different conceptions of authority. I will then argue that
these differences also manifest themselves in different answers to substantive questions within
private law. I will demonstrate this claim by looking at a few of the last decisions of the House
of Lords and argue that we can make better sense of some divergences among the law lords if
we understand them to hold different views on the authority of (common) law. Finally, I will
argue that even assuming the view of authority that is most sympathetic to common law convergence, there are practical constraints that make such a convergence difficult to maintain.
This explains why we see growing divergences among common law jurisdictions, a trend that I
predict will continue.

5

For example, contrast Robert Stevens’s claim that divergences within the common law are ‘disturbing’,
which he makes in ‘Torts’ in Louis Blom-Cooper et al (eds), The Judicial House of Lords: 1876–2009 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 629, 630, with his affirmation of divergences between common law and civil law jurisdictions in Torts and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 341, 347.
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II. Three Views on the Authority of (Common) Law
In this section I will present three views about the authority of the common law. I will first
present these views as ideal-types. As will become clearer towards the end of this section, reality is typically more complex; nevertheless, I believe the ideal-types approach helps to bring to
light the issues that are at stake.6

A. Legal Localism
No-one finds it odd that Britain’s constitutional law is different from Germany’s or that
France’s copyright laws are different from those of the United States. No-one finds it odd that
these differences are not confined to details, that they reflect a different ‘philosophy’ about
separation of powers or democracy, about what these areas of law seek to achieve, or what values a legal system should strive to protect or promote through them. Why should tort or contract law be any different? Presenting the question in this way helps articulate a view. On this
view, whether law deals with the regulation of air travel, the definition of and punishment for
theft, the formation of contracts, or the legal response to cartels, it is the product of state authorities. True, some of the laws are created by the legislature, other laws by other public bodies (administrative tribunals, government bureaucrats, courts), but this fact does not show
that the source of authority of laws of the second kind is any different from that of laws of the
first kind. The fact that judges make law is thus in itself not more problematic than the fact
that civil servants make law. (Even legislation, officially enacted by a democratically-elected
legislature, is rarely exclusively, or even primarily, the work of the people’s democraticallyelected representatives; but that is a different matter.) In short, this view subsumes the common law under the general lawmaking power of the state. The way of solving the puzzle of the
authority of the common law is not to present the common law as unique—the common law
on this view is law just like any other—but rather by explaining how the way it is promulgated can be made to fit our ideas of democratic authority. In the modern state where much law
is not created by elected representatives, that does not look like an insurmountable challenge.
If the mere fact that judges make law in those areas we call ‘common law’ is not a challenge to democratic authority (any more than any other delegated lawmaking is), it does,
however, affect the specific contours of its institutions. For in a place in which this is the dominant conception of the authority of the common law we can expect to see its institutions
shaped and understood in a way that fits these democratic credentials. Within the common
law world, the country whose legal institutions reflect this view more purely than any other is
the United States. And indeed, there are certain unique features to American common law
that make sense only if one assumes the view that the authority of law derives from its being
made by state institutions. I will mention three: Much more than in other common law coun6

The ideas in this section are developed in greater detail in Dan Priel, ‘Conceptions of Authority, Common
Law Divergences, and the Future of a Common Law World’ (unpublished). Unlike the three-fold typology found
in this essay, there I present a related, but somewhat different, four-fold typology.
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tries the ‘common law’ of the United States—the law of contract, tort, and property of the
different states—is nowadays codified. If the common law is not unique, if this area of law is
not somehow a unique domain of the judiciary, then like all other law it should be found in
statute. A second feature in which American common law now differs from most of the rest of
the common law world is its continued commitment to a jury trial in both criminal and civil
matters. Part of the justification offered for maintaining the jury trial is that it is a popular
lawmaking institution, a means for ‘the people’ to have a say in, or control over, what the law
is.7 Finally, there is the method of appointing judges. What strikes outsiders as one of the
oddest features of American law is the prevalence of elected judiciary in state courts. Even
with federal judges, who are not elected, their nomination process is openly political in a
manner that has no parallel in other common law countries. This practice looks much less
odd against the view that the lawmaking activity of judges must satisfy democratic constraints. All this fits a view much more dominant in American politics than elsewhere, which
is that the executive and the judiciary (and not just the legislature) are representative of the
people.8
The answer to the puzzle of the authority of the common law, then, is that there is no
puzzle. Judge-made common law is not undemocratic if, first, it is conceived of as a form of
democratic lawmaking power; and, second, when there are various institutional mechanisms
in place as well as an underlying democratic ethos for the common law, that turn this idea
into a reality. When this approach is applied to the question of common law convergence, it
implies a relatively unsympathetic view to convergence. Different legal systems will, of course,
sometimes converge, but this is, more or less, a happenstance. It is not at all something to aim
for. While not universally accepted, this view is very popular in the United States.

B. Legal Universalism
At the other end of the spectrum we find the universalist view according to which underlying
the law there are some general principles applicable to all the world. This position has a long
and distinguished history under various names, but it is probably best known as ‘natural law’.
Stated abstractly, the idea that law should match some pre-existing, universal, standards is
very familiar. It is held not just by self-styled natural lawyers, but also by their supposed intellectual opposites, legal positivists.9 It is also held across the political spectrum, although those
on the right tend to call those principles ‘natural rights’ whereas those on the left usually prefer to speak of ‘human rights’.
7

See Jenny E Carroll, ‘Nullification as Law’ (2014) 102 Georgetown Law Journal 579.
See Robert J Pushaw, ‘Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach’ (1996) 81 Cornell
Law Review 393, 420–25.
9
Even the more specific claim, that law is authoritative to the extent that it matches morality is a nowadays
a familiar positivist idea. This is achieved by the fact that most legal positivists these days think of it as a thesis
about legal validity rather than a thesis about authority. For more on this see Dan Priel, ‘Toward Classical Legal
Positivism’ (2015) 101 Virginia Law Review (forthcoming).
8
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Here, however, I prefer to talk about a more specific idea, the view that law has authority
because, and to the extent that, it matches pre-existing universal morality. Understood as a
view about authority, legal universalism is not embarrassed by the obvious reality of divergence between the laws of different countries. A proponent of this view need to accept two
propositions: First, that there are universal moral principles that underlie the law; and second,
that the authority of positive law derives from its correspondence with natural law.
This view thus attempts to answer the puzzle of the authority of the common law by
denying that the authority of law derives from its democratic credentials. If this is so, then the
fact that the common law is undemocratic is not, by itself, a reason to question its authority
any more than the authority of any other law. Thus, in pure form, this view rejects the
uniqueness of the common law, but it does that in the opposite way to legal localism: No law
is authoritative because of its democratic credentials. Both common (judge-made) law and
statutes ultimately derive their authority from their correspondence to pre-existing moral
norms. This view also rejects the uniqueness of the common law in another sense. It denies
that there is anything special to common law jurisdictions, and therefore it denies that legal
convergence should be limited just to these jurisdictions. If the underlying authority of all law
is its correspondence with universal morality, it follows that the ideal of convergence of law
extends to the whole world.10
Thus, in one sense, this view endorses a very strong version of convergence. In another
sense, however, this view sees no value in convergence per se. There is on this view little or no
value in convergence if different legal systems converge on the wrong rules or principles. Even
when legal systems converge on the right principles, the fact of convergence does not add to
the goodness of the situation. Of course, it is better if more jurisdictions identify the right
answers to what the content of their laws should be, but the fact of convergence itself adds
nothing to the merit of this situation.
A seemingly intractable challenge to this view is the fact that in the modern state much
lawmaking is done by democratic institutions and does not pay particular heed to universal
morality and is premised on the unique needs of a particular time and place. Even if one accepts that the common law reflects some universal values, the fairly insignificant amount of
lawmaking done by judges these days, when compared to the vast amount of lawmaking in
the modern regulatory state, would seem to render this position completely untenable as an
argument for the authority of all law.
A proponent of legal universalism may respond in three ways. The most radical response
asserts that only universal laws—laws that avoid the promotion of particular policies—do not
violate the rule of law, and only these laws can ultimately be justified. This was, for example,

10

For an example of this view see Allan Beever, ‘How to Have a Common Private Law: The Presuppositions
of Legal Conversation’ (this volume). Though at one point he says that ‘divergence [between common law jurisdictions] is always problematic’ (MS at 10), he is clear that the ideal of convergence he aims for is not limited to the
common law world. See ibid., at 25.
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Hayek’s answer in The Road to Serfdom. In the chapter on the rule of law Hayek argued that
only general rules that similarly apply to all (all over the world) are consistent with the rule of
law.11 Closer to contemporary debates, this is also the answer offered by Allan Beever. Though
he constructs his view somewhat differently, Beever believes that ‘there is an objective truth at
which the law of the various jurisdictions aims’. He therefore rejects the idea that divergence
between jurisdictions is to be explained by different ‘respons[es] to local conditions that differ
between jurisdictions’; rather, he thinks that what explains those divergences is that different
courts are ‘trying to do the same thing where reasonable people can reasonably disagree as to
what ought to be done’.12 As presented, this argument is a fallacious. It is clearly not true that
as a general matter laws cannot differ on the basis of local conditions: if one thinks that laws
can be used to promote overall welfare, it is plain that local conditions will matter a great deal
for determining the appropriate content for laws. Beever’s argument can only go through with
the addition of a missing premise, namely that local conditions are irrelevant in lawmaking,
and this view, in turn, can only be sustained if he assumes (like Hayek) that laws ought not be
used to promote welfare.13
Others, of less libertarian leanings, have adopted more accommodating strategies. One
such approach recognizes the legitimacy of democratic lawmaking but considers it secondary—logically and normatively—to the universal principles enshrined in the common law.
Consequently, democratically-adopted laws that conflict with the fundamental principles of
the common law lack legitimate authority and may be declared legally invalid by a court, regardless of an enabling constitutional provision.14 As this accommodating approach is more
commonly adopted by Commonwealth public law scholars, I will set it aside here.

11

F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge, 2001 [1944]) ch 6. Hayek contrasts there a ‘permanent framework of laws’, which consists of ‘rules applying to general types of situations’ with ‘the direction of economic activity by a central authority’. Ibid., 76, 79. (In later writings he may have been closer to the universal
common law approach I will discuss below.)
12
Beever (n 10) MS at 22, 24.
13
Elsewhere Beever claims that policy should have no place in any law (and not just in ‘private law’). See Allan Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford: Hart, 2007) 71. It is this view, as well as views he expresses
elsewhere that warrant treating his position as more radical than Weinrib’s and places him very close to Hayek. See
Dan Priel, ‘Private Law: Commutative or Distributive?’ (2014) 77 Modern Law Review 308, 328–29. However, in
some places Beever accepts something like the distinctions found in Table 1. See Beever, Rediscovering, ibid., 13–14,
52–53. In these places Beever accepts the weaker thesis that only the common law should not be used to promote
welfare.
14
See e.g., John Laws, The Common Law Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 3
(‘The common law is the interpreter of our statutes, and is the crucible which gives them life….[S]tatute law and
government policy alike are delivered to the people through the prism of [common law] principles [such as reason,
fairness, and the presumption of liberty]. This is the gift of the common law, the unifying principle of our constitution. It is the means by which legislature and government are allowed efficacy but forbidden oppression.’); see
also John Laws, ‘Law and Democracy’ [1995] Public Law 72.
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The last response to the challenge from democracy is more often found in the work of
Commonwealth private law scholars. Rather than prioritizing between the common law and
statute, it sees the two as distinct and largely independent domains. This approach seeks further support for the normative significance of the distinction between common law and statute by tying it to a series of additional, partially overlapping, distinctions:
Common law
Statute
Courts
Legislatures
Private Law
Public law
Morality (and moral philosophy)
Politics (and political philosophy)
Principle
Policy
Corrective justice
Distributive justice
Individual rights
General welfare
Expertise (about morals)
Democracy
Table 1: The common law–statute divide
The authority of the common law on this view is still derived from its correspondence to
moral truth; by contrast, the authority of statute derives from different societies’ adoption of
different policies on the basis of their political preferences, as revealed by democratic processes. This view thus abandons common law universalism with regard to subject-matter, but
maintains it with regard to geographic scope. The ideal convergence of private law on this
view is not limited to common law jurisdictions: Reflecting universal morality, the content of
private law should ideally be more or less the same throughout the world; public law, however,
is for each political community to develop in accordance to its own values.
It is well beyond the scope of this essay to carefully examine the merits of this view, but I
will make three brief critical remarks about it. Beginning with an empirical observation, a
fundamental problem with this approach is that it simply does not correspond to reality. The
areas of law that are typically classified as ‘private law’ (contract, tort, and property) are shot
through with statutes, which are often clearly motivated by distributive concerns. The divide
also breaks down on the other side, since judges quite constantly invoke policy and distributive considerations in their determination and justification of common law rules.
I turn now to more theoretical concerns. Defenders of the view that private law should
be free from policy often argue that this should be so, because the introduction of policy considerations into private law will necessarily render that area of law incoherent.15 But the strategy represented in Table 1 does not avoid the problem of incoherence (assuming it is a problem), it only shoves it out of the private lawyer’s sight. So long as private law and public law
come into contact, the clashes between principle and policy, between rights and general welfare, between corrective and distributive justice are not avoided, they are moved somewhere
else. If anything, the strategy that insists on somehow not talking about these interactions, on
15

See Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, new ed. 2012) 32–44.
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engaging in private law as if public law does not exist (and vice versa), only makes the problem worse.
Finally, for this view to be plausible there has to be something about judges that explains
why they should decide certain questions and not democratic institutions. The typical answer
democracies give to this question is that they allocate law-making power to non-democratic
bodies when these bodies have special expertise on certain matters. Following this rationale, it
makes sense to give this power if there is something about judges that lends credence to the
idea that they are experts on identifying true, universal morality. Though such claims are
sometimes made, it is entirely unclear what they are based on. Despite the veneration still
accorded to appellate judges, most judges have not left a mark on history as particularly original or insightful thinkers, and very few of them would make it to any list of history’s greatest
moral thinkers. To even make sense, we should believe that there is something in the training
or occupation of judges that makes them moral experts, but there is little reason to think that.
For myself, I am not sure what would count as moral expertise, but if repeated engagement
with moral questions had been shown to sharpen one’s moral sensibilities, moral philosophers
would have made better candidates for the judiciary than lawyers. At the very least, for this
claim to make sense, we would have expected judges to immerse themselves in the writings of
moral philosophers (rather than those of lawyers) as a precondition for getting the job.

C. Common Law Universalism
The two positions just outlined correspond, at least roughly, to one understanding of the divide between two familiar legal philosophies: legal positivism and natural law. These two approaches dominate jurisprudential discussions to such an extent that they seem to exhaust the
theoretical space. These two views, however, neglect a third position, one that is in fact the
most popular within in the common law world (outside the United States). This approach
sees a special unity among all common law jurisdictions but not between common law and
non-common law jurisdictions. In other words, proponents of this view take a midway position between the two views considered earlier. To many common lawyers this view comes so
naturally that they hardly bother to think about the fact that if they write on the law of contract, they may take particular interest in the judicial pronouncements of their own jurisdiction, but they will also closely follow developments in other common law jurisdictions. On
the other hand, they will make much less of an effort to keep track with developments in the
law of contract of non-common law jurisdictions, even when those non-common law jurisdictions (as is the case in Canada or Britain) belong to their own country! This view is not
meant as a mere description of reality: as mentioned, many think that this view implies that
common law systems ought to converge.
Can we make sense of this view? From the perspective of universalist natural law, this
view seems odd. It asks us to assume, in effect, that all legal (or moral) wisdom descended on
certain parts of the world and not on others. From the perspective of the localist view, this
view is odd in asserting that its laws should aim to be similar to those of several completely

9

independent countries. The key to understanding the common law convergence view is that it
presupposes a distinct view of authority, one that sees the authority of law (or at least the authority of the common law) as grounded in history. On this mode of authority, we ought to
do certain things in a particular way today, because of the fact that we did certain things in a
similar way in the past.
This view thus asks us to derive an ought from an is. Could such a view ever be justified?
Several arguments have been proposed in defence of this view, but here I will only consider
one. This view maintains that we can make of our duties to others only by assuming our
membership in a community; they further argue that the content of those obligations is neither a product of some social contract nor derived from reason. Rather, it derives from the
history of that community. It is this history that shapes our normative realities and it implies
that it is only through an engagement with the community’s political past that we can identify
our present-day obligations to other members of the community.
A key element to this view is the idea of a tradition, not merely as a description of a certain set of ideas, but as a normative concept.16 By ‘tradition’ I mean an amalgamation of prevailing ideas and concepts in a particular community combined with a more-or-less conscious
sense of participation in a joint endeavour with past members of that community. Whatever
are the normative merits of this view, there are many reasons to think that the common law
tradition embraces something like this view. Legal rules are often developed by careful attention to past practice rather than by direct appeal to reason.
This idea is in plain sight with the doctrine of precedent. Within a broadly Hartian version of legal positivism precedents create rules (or at least parts of rules). Precedent on this
view is simply a different technique of promulgating legal rules. Within the natural law view
precedents are understood as an ongoing enterprise seeking to find out what the law is.
Different decisions reflect the ongoing enterprise of discovering moral truth, but by themselves precedents have no significance: like the rest of the law, their authority derives from
their content, if it corresponds to morality. From this perspective past decisions are merely a
repository of attempts at discovering moral truths whose existence and content is entirely independent of legal practice. This is the background that explains why both views find it a real
puzzle why we should follow a ‘wrong’ precedent, a precedent that we now judge to be inconsistent with the requirements of morality. But this problem is entirely the product of the assumption that what we ought to do is fixed outside of our practices. If this assumption is rejected—as it is within this understanding of the authority of the common law—the problem
does not arise, or rather arises in a much more attenuated form. So long as we can show that
the precedent itself followed on the tradition, it makes little sense to claim that the precedent
16

For a very strong version of this view, especially in relation to precedent, see Anthony T Kronman, ‘Precedent and Tradition’ (1990) 99 Yale Law Journal 1029; cf Iain Hampsher-Monk, ‘Political Languages in Time—The
Work of J.G.A. Pocock’ (1984) 14 British Journal of Political Science 89, 105 (‘The notion of tradition which is so
essential to an understanding of precedent-based behaviours pervades…[Pocock’s] work, and plays a key role in his
notion of explanation of history in the history of ideas’).
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is ‘wrong’. On this view precedents can only be seen as wrong when they can be shown to be
wrong ‘the day they were decided’, i.e. when they can be shown to be themselves departures
from the requirements of the tradition, not of some universal moral standard.17
The greatest strength of this account for our purposes is that it provides a ready explanation for the view that finds divergences among common law jurisdictions problematic but is
indifferent to divergences between common law systems and other legal systems. To see this,
contrast the tradition view with a different view that was once used to explain common law
convergence. Around the turn of the twentieth century one finds Anglophone legal scholars
speaking of a ‘national character’ shared by the English-speaking world. Whether such a thing
as a national character even exists is suspect,18 but even if it did, on this view the fact of common law convergence (and common law–non-common law divergence) would be explained
by the tendency of nations having laws that match their national ‘traits’.19 This view thus
strongly suggests that common law convergence would emerge naturally and without conscious attempt at maintaining convergence.
Though not without difficulties, the tradition view can provide a less mysterious basis for
both explaining the fact of common law convergence. Since different common law countries
share a history, we have an explanation for the fact of convergence. But unlike the national
character explanation, the tradition view also provides an argument for maintaining convergence. A tradition, in the way I use it here, involves participation in a joint endeavour and
implies that those jurisdictions that belong to a single tradition, will have reason to uphold
the tradition, not because it is a tradition and not simply out of respect for the past, but because of their present commitment to the continued existence of the community constituted
and epitomized by the tradition. To the extent that the tradition is (seen to be) made up of all
jurisdictions that derive from the common law of England, all of them should be committed
to maintaining their convergence. Since there is no similar tradition tying common law juris-

17

For a clear example see R v R [1992] 1 AC 599, where the House of Lords repudiated the doctrine that a
man cannot rape his wife. Most of the decision was focused on the weak precedential force of the doctrine, with a
short discussion on changing moral and social standards with little or no discussion about the timeless wrongness
of this view. In fact, the decision stated that it rejected ‘reflected the state of affairs in these respects at the time it
was enunciated’. Ibid., 616.
18
For reasons to doubt see A Terracciano et al, ‘National Character Does Not Reflect Mean Personality Trait
Levels in 49 Cultures’ (2005) 310 Science 96.
19
See e.g., AV Dicey, ‘A Common Citizenship for the English Race’ (1897) 71 Contemporary Review 457,
468–69; James Bryce, ‘The Influence of National Character and Historical Environment on the Development of
the Common Law’ (1907) 8 Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation 203, 203–04, 206–08. I do not address
here the question of the scope of convergence, but it is interesting to note in this context that those who talk of the
importance of convergence in the common law almost always talk of between England, Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and to a lesser extent the United States. Much less is said of the importance of convergence with India, by
far the populous common law country; nor, for that matter, with the thirty-odd jurisdictions for which the Privy
Council in London is still the court of final appeal.
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dictions with civil law jurisdictions, there is no normative requirement for maintaining convergence with them.
In this respect the common law universalism view is the mirror image of legal universalism (this is important to highlight, since both views are sometimes called ‘natural law’): the
tradition view limits the scope of convergence, and in this respect it subscribes to a weaker
ideal of convergence, but in another sense it endorses a much stronger version of it. Unlike
legal universalism (as well as, of course, legal localism) this view sees convergence by itself, i.e.
convergence regardless of what legal systems converge on, as valuable. Of course, once a tradition settles on a path, then straying from that path is wrong; this is the sense in which a tradition has normative force. But the path itself is not inherently better than other paths: it is just
a different one.20
The tradition view of the common law also has an answer to the puzzle of authority of
the common law. The common law is not democratic in the majoritarian sense, nor is derived
from the authority of the state. The common law is justified for its ability to maintain the
deep currents of thought of a particular community, one that in the case of the common law
(so the argument would go) extends beyond state boundaries. This last point also helps us
identify another explanatory advantage of this view over legal universalism, namely that it
better fits legal practice and the role judges have in it. To justify the allocation of decisionmaking power to judges the legal universalist must hold that judges are moral experts, that
they are better than others in finding moral truths. The proponent of the common law tradition view maintains the far more plausible view that judges are experts in the common law
tradition. It is exactly for this reason that a large part of their training and working life is dedicating to mastering past legal materials (and not in the work of moral philosophers). That is
also why in writing their decisions they consult and cite past cases: not just, perhaps not even
primarily, in order to economize on their time and effort by not having to think from scratch
on legal questions presented to them. From the common law tradition view, the act of consulting past cases and trying to find the answer in them (or perhaps through them) reflects the
ongoing commitments derived from being part of a non-universal tradition. This perspective
also gives as the means for understanding and explaining how the common law can change, as
it is influenced by changing ideas, but also why it changes so slowly. Unlike universalism that
assumes that moral constants remain largely unchanged, the common law tradition view can
explain how two legal decisions from different era can both be different from each other,
without having to hold that either decision was wrong.
Yet another advantage of this view is that it can explain how the common law can be political in one sense—it reflects certain political commitments (for instance, a certain conception of liberty)—while remaining apolitical in another—as its political commitments are dis-
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Stevens says so explicitly: ‘Legal systems have their own internal logic. Saying that the common law of
torts is rights-based, while other legal systems are not, is not intended to be an implicit reprimand of other ways of
doing things’. Stevens, Torts and Rights (n 5) 347.
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tinct from the everyday politics of majoritarian democracy. Against this background we can
make sense of why this view of the authority of the common law is also unsympathetic to policy. It is not because policy reflects an intrusion of politics per se into the domain of law; it is
rather the intrusion of the wrong kind of politics, the kind of everyday politics which is the
proper domain of government and majoritarian democracy. This explains why many defenders of ‘blackletter law’ insist on the autonomy of law and legal scholarship: though the law
will be influenced by popular views, those can only be relevant to the law to the extent that
they are manifested in, or translated into, ‘internal’ legal categories. It is only by insisting on
the relative closure of law, by avoiding the ‘intrusion’ of ideas from other disciplines (either
directly or through legislation, where such ideas are more likely to have an impact) that the
common law tradition can be maintained.
Even though this view provides a more convincing account of certain familiar features of
the common law than either localism or universalism, it is surprisingly absent from jurisprudential discussions.21 This is probably because in present-day moral discourse the usual assumption is that our moral obligations are fixed constants, true regardless of our acceptance or
recognition of them. Most jurisprudential debates—and both legal positivists and natural
lawyers—assume that the law is on the lookout for those fixed constants, which it aims to
match. Much of what one sees in actual common law practice amounts to a rejection of this
view.
This view is, of course, not without its difficulties. One set of concerns (at least for some)
is that this view tends to be conservative. A different set of concerns has to do with the fuzzy
concept of ‘tradition’. Much historical work has been dedicated to showing that how traditions are invented or manufactured.22 The common law tradition is no exception. English
common law is originally in fact the law of the Norman (French) conquerors. In the centuries
that followed, English lawyers continued to draw unselfconsciously on Roman law and their
civilian contemporaries. As recently as the late nineteenth century, when English (and American) lawyers had to construct a theory for the case-law after the collapse of the writ system,
they relied heavily treatises on civil law.
In a way, these historical facts are on their own of relatively little significance, because
traditions depend on a continued commitment to the perpetuation of a myth. So long as the
myth is believed, it can provide the sufficient normative foundation for its continued existence. Of course, traditions can (and often have been) challenged for their inaccuracy; but it is
21

The most systematic attempt to develop such ideas in the context of the common law has been provided
by Postema. See e.g., Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)
63–77. The work of Ronald Dworkin (perhaps unconsciously) bears important similarities (as well as important
dissimilarities) with this view, but it is rare to see his work discussed outside the legal positivism/natural law dichotomy. The matter is discussed at length in Dan Priel, ‘Making Some Sense of Nonsense Jurisprudence’ (unpublished manuscript).
22
See Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
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typically not historians alone that topple a tradition. It is interesting to note, however, that
those who wish to create greater convergence among all European legal systems have worked
hard on creating an opposite narrative, one that emphasizes the historical links among all
those legal systems that are together said to have contributed to—surprise!—a single ‘Western’
or ‘European legal tradition’.23

D. Complicating the Picture
As stated at the beginning of this section, the account provided so far in this section is somewhat simplified. This is because it does not adequately cover all possible answers to the question of the authority of the common law. This simplification was attained by distinguishing
between the view that all law derives its authority from the state, all law derives its authority
from correspondence with external moral standards, and the view that draws a sharp divide
between the common law and statute with regard to their authority. These three views can
thus be presented in the following tables:
Universal

Common law

Local
Statutes

Common law

Table 2: The state law conception of authority
Universal
Common law
Local
Statutes

Common law

Table 3: The natural law conception of authority
Universal

Common law
Local
Statutes

Common law

Table 4: The common law conception of authority24
Tables 2–4 present three distinct and non-overlapping models of authority. The tables are
useful also for highlighting other possible configurations of the authority of law. Some of
these may not be adopted by anyone, but others are live possibilities. As we have seen, however, proponents of both the natural law and the common law models have attempted to ad-
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See, for example, Reinhard Zimmermann, ‘Roman Law and European Culture’ [2007] New Zealand Law
Review 341, 365–72.
24
The scholars I focus on tend to write on private law and their views on the authority of statute is not always clear. Many, it seems, favour the kind of division of authority represented by Table 5. If there are adherents to
the view represented by Table 4, perhaps they are best represented by some of the proponents of common law constitutionalism. I cannot discuss their views here.
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dress the shortcomings of their approach, both positive and normative, by defending a weaker
position that typically looks more like this:
Universal
Common law
Local
Statutes

Common law
()
()
Table 5: Mixed conceptions of authority
There are possibly other ways in which the different basic approaches may intersect. A longer
essay might have attempted a more elaborate taxonomy. But since legal taxonomies only serve
as useful models of reality, there is a point at which an over-elaborate model obscures more
than it illuminates.
There is another important way in which the picture presented so far may seem to be a
simplification of reality. I indicated that the view summarized in Table 2 corresponds with
American common law, the view summarized in Table 3 is more commonly an academic view,
and the view summarized in Table 4 as reflecting English common law. Of course, reality is
more complicated than that. One can find examples of people or courts in the United States
who express views that are closer to the second or third approach, just as one can find outside
the United States people who express views quite similar to the first.25 Once one goes beyond
models more subtle differences arise. For example, even when tradition-based positions are
defended in the context of American law, three facts are notable. First, such arguments are
more commonly directed at explaining and justifying the common law that engulfs the United States Constitution as well as courts’ power of judicial review, rather than the common law
of contract and tort. This reflects the fact that at least among legal academics, it is the Constitution, rather than the common law, that is more commonly seen these days as the source of
Americans’ communal commitments.26 Traditional common law, decided by state courts by
(usually) elected judges and often on the basis of legislation, has less significance in the American polity. Second and related, even Americans sympathetic to the idea of law as a tradition

25

Even this might be challenged. American law, much more than other common law jurisdictions, is committed to the ‘natural law’ idea that sees no clear distinction between law and morality and that is willing to infuse
moral ideas into the law whether or not they have been formally incorporated by a legislative statement. See P.S.
Atiyah & Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law: A Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning,
Legal Theory, and Legal Institutions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987) 43–46. It is notable, however, that when moral
norms are being incorporated, what is often said to be incorporated are norms accepted by the American public,
not universal moral criteria.
26
For a tradition-based justification of judge-made constitutional law see David A Strauss, ‘Common Law
Constitutional Interpretation’ (1996) 63 University of Chicago Law Review 877, 891–94, 900–03, 929–30. For a similar answer to the countermajoritarian difficulty of judicial review of legislation see Alexander Bickel, The Least
Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 2nd edn (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) 23–
33.
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now see the ‘American way of law’27 as a distinct tradition, one that despite its historical roots
to English common law, has long since charted its own distinct path founded on distinctly
American values. Finally, it seems to me that the American approach is more open to the influence of contemporary prevailing values from without, rather than to the reasoned elaboration
of past legal materials in order to derive certain normative commitments from within. This,
again, is a reflection of the greater role for ideas of self-government in the American version of
the common law, rather than the elitist enterprise which is more characteristic of the common
law approach elsewhere.28

III. Implications
The last section has already explored some ways in which these ‘philosophical’ differences
manifest themselves in differences in legal practice, for instance by providing an explanation
to the unique American practice of elected judges. I have also attempted to show that these
different ways of thinking about the common law also lead to different attitudes on the question of the significance of convergence. In this section I explore this matter further by looking
more concretely into one manifestation of the question of common law convergence, namely
the attitude toward reliance on foreign legal materials. Perhaps more intriguingly, I then turn
to a substantive question, the scope of negligence liability of public authorities. I will try to
show that the divergence in views in recent House of Lords decision on the matter can be explained, at least in part, by drawing on the ideas canvassed in this essay.

A. The Use of Comparative Law in Private Law
Basil Markesinis has been an indefatigable champion of the value of reliance on foreign law,
and while he has been able to find many adherents to the cause in Europe (including England), he has been frustrated and puzzled by most Americans’ lack of interest in foreign law

27

I borrow this phrase from Robert A Kagan, Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2001). See also the series of twelve articles exploring ‘commonplace aspects of the American justice system that are virtually unique in the world’, available at http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/news/us/series/american_exception/ (visited 2 Dec. 2014). For a more partisan argument that American law
and society were created in conscious opposition to the legal systems and ideas of the Old World see Steven G
Calabresi, ‘“A Shining City on a Hill”: American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court’s Practice of Relying on
Foreign Law’ (2006) 86 Boston University Law Review 1335.
28
For more on the American case see Priel (n 6) section II.(b)–(c). See also Dan Priel, ‘The Law and Politics
of Unjust Enrichment’ (2013) 63 University of Toronto Law Journal 533. In the latter essay I exploited these different
understandings of law as the basis for explaining Americans’ lack of interest in unjust enrichment. Without using
the terminology used in this essay, I argued there that the thriving of unjust enrichment is the product of a need to
solve problems with areas of law within a tradition-based conception of authority of the common law, which does
not allow for radical changes in those areas of law. When those concerns are absent, there is less need for a distinct
area of law of unjust enrichment.
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and outright resistance to relying on it in developing their law.29 His attempts at explaining
this failure have focused mostly on what he perceived to be tactical errors made by American
proponents of the use of foreign law. He admonished them for failing to answer questions like
whether foreign law can be used to restrict or enlarge constitutional rights, or their use of
‘strong and emotive language’.30 These are unconvincing explanations.31 There is no recognition in any of the opponents’ writing on the matter that it is the incompleteness of the proponents’ arguments that is the basis of their opposition. The language used is also a poor explanation. Opponents of same-sex marriage in the United States have also used strong and
emotive language, and yet on that matter their opponents are losing ground fast. What is
completely absent from Markesinis writings on the matter is any serious attempt to consider
the significance of ideas.32
Though Markesinis’s remarks are general, he expressed particular dismay at Americans’
unwillingness to look at foreign law in the ‘the domains of contract or tort’,33 stating also that
‘the introvertedness or self-sufficiency of Americans is now spreading to, should I say infecting,
private law as well as public law where, at least, one can make with greater cogency the argument about democracy being trumped by unelected officials, namely judges’.34 These remarks
reveal Markesinis’s own normative commitments, and his unwillingness to recognize that the
source of the resistance is ideological. Markesinis assumes that public law and private law have
different sources of authority, which explains why he thinks private law is more readily appropriate for comparative law. This is not a description of what things are in the world; it follows
from a particular political position, one that itself sees public law as the product of local politics but private law as something else. But my anecdotal experience is that the idea that there
is a fundamental distinction between private and public law is one that many American lawyers reject, and if my explanation above is correct, we can see why.
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See Basil Markesinis, ‘National Self-Sufficiency or Intellectual Arrogance: The Current Attitude of American Courts towards Foreign Law’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 301.
30
Ibid., 311.
31
For an illuminating exploration of the strengths and limitations of reliance on foreign law, as well as a valuable critique of Markesinis (albeit rather different from mine) see Jane Stapleton, ‘Benefits of Comparative Tort
Reasoning: Lost in Translation’ in Mads Andenas & Duncan Fairgrieve (eds), Tom Bingham and the Transformation
of the Law: A Liber Amicorum (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 773.
32
Markesinis is sceptical to the idea of ‘legal culture’ as having much explanatory power in Basil Markesinis,
‘Judicial Mentality: Mental Disposition or Outlook as a Factor Impeding Recourse to Foreign Law’ (2006) 80
Tulane Law Review 1325, 1356 n 89.
33
Markesinis (n 29) 324.
34
Basil Markesinis, ‘Understanding American Law by Looking at It through Foreign Eyes: Towards a Wider
Theory for the Study and Use of Foreign Law’ (2006) 81 Tulane Law Review 123, 171. See also his remark that ‘it
does not take much ingenuity but only a minimum amount of disingenuousness to claim that, for instance, even
ordinary contract and tort rules can be linked to “values” held dear by some societies in order to preserve the status
quo’. Markesinis (n 29) 317.
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When the political presuppositions that underlie Markesinis’s views are brought to the
fore, what he takes to be obvious—that examining foreign law is conducive to the ‘search for
truth and justice’35—appears much less obvious than he presents it. Markesinis fails to understand that what counts as ‘justice’ (or at least ‘justice according to law’) and what counts as
‘truth’ with regard to a proposition of law, depends on an underlying political philosophy. In a
political community that sees its legal justice and legal truth as derived from the will of its
people, the use of foreign law is a subversion of truth and justice, whether or not the law in
question is a common law jurisdiction.36 Of course, not all Americans accept this view, and
there are many who see value in reference to foreign law. But if we seek to understand their
views, there are often best explained by the presupposition that at least part of the law is
grounded in different notions of authority, most notably its correspondence to universal human rights.

B. Implications for Substantive Private Law
In this section, I turn to a more speculative suggestion. I will attempt to show that different
views about the authority of the common law and the value of common law convergence correspond in a non-coincidental way to different attitudes to the question of negligence liability
of public authorities. To demonstrate this point, I will compare the views of Lords Bingham
and Hoffmann, probably Britain’s most influential judges of the last two decades.
Bingham and Hoffmann have expressed rather different views on the value of comparative law, especially when it came from European, civil law countries. Bingham was a lifelong
champion of ‘widening the horizons’ of English law.37 Hoffmann, by contrast, has always
been more sceptical of European influences on indigenous English law.38 Where Bingham
thought the European Convention of Human Rights was a document of surpassing signifi-
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Markesinis (n 34) 170.
See Roper v Simmons, (2005) 543 US 551, 626–27 (Scalia J, dissenting) (‘The [majority’s] special reliance on
the laws of the United Kingdom is perhaps the most indefensible part of its opinion….It is beyond comprehension
why we should look…to a country that has developed, in the century since the Revolutionary War—and with
increasing speed since the United Kingdom’s recent submission to the jurisprudence of European courts dominated
by continental jurists—a legal, political, and social culture quite different from our own.’). On the proliferation of
statutes across the United States that prohibit judicial reliance on any foreign law see Andrea Elliott, ‘The Man
Behind the Anti-Sharia Movement’, New York Times (30 July 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/
31/us/31shariah.html (visited 2 Dec. 2014).
37
See Tom Bingham, Widening Horizons: The Influence of Comparative Law and International Law on Domestic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Tom Bingham, ‘“There Is a World Elsewhere”: The
Changing Perspectives of English Law’ in The Business of Judging: Selected Essays and Speeches 1985–1999 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000) 87. See also his remark in Fairchild v Glenhaven [2002] 1 AC 32 at [32]: ‘In a shrinking world…there must be some virtue to uniformity in outcome whatever the diversity of approach in reaching
that outcome’.
38
See Lord Hoffmann, ‘Human Rights and the House of Lords’ (1999) 62 Modern Law Review 159; Leonard
Hoffmann, ‘The Universality of Human Rights’ (2009) 125 Law Quarterly Review 416.
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cance for its affirmation of universal human rights,39 Hoffmann thought the very idea of universal human rights close to incoherent, and has defended instead ‘the essentially national
character of rights’.40 Where Bingham wrote of ‘our law has been enriched by the injection of
international jurisprudence, emanating from [the European Court of Human Rights in]
Strasbourg, and binding on the UK in international law’,41 Hoffmann expressed doubts about
the very legitimacy of that court.42
This difference also played itself out in Bingham and Hoffmann’s respective judicial
opinions. In a case dealing with the legality of indefinite detention of foreign nationals in
British prisons, Bingham, relying on extensive analysis of European legal materials, rejected
the government’s position and declared some legislation incompatible with the European
Convention. Hoffmann reached the same conclusion, but on wholly different grounds. He
thought that it is the affirmation of ‘a quintessentially British liberty’ that supports the petitioners, not any European jurisprudence. His speech reads as a textbook statement of the view
that sees the common law as a unique political tradition:
I would not like anyone to think that we are concerned with some special doctrine of European
law. Freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention is a quintessentially British liberty, enjoyed by
the inhabitants of this country when most of the population of Europe could be thrown into
prison at the whim of their rulers. It was incorporated into the European Convention in order
to entrench the same liberty in countries which had recently been under Nazi occupation. The
United Kingdom subscribed to the Convention because it set out the rights which British subjects enjoyed under the common law….43
The “nation” is a social organism, living in its territory (in this case, the United Kingdom) under
its own form of government and subject to a system of laws which expresses its own political
and moral values. When one speaks of a threat to the “life” of the nation, the word life is being
used in a metaphorical sense. The life of the nation is not coterminous with the lives of its people. The nation, its institutions and values, endure through generations. In many important re39
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Bingham, Widening Horizons (n 37) 82.
42
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A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 68 at [88]; cf Bryce (n 19)
204–05; Kenneth Minogue, ‘The Elusive Oakeshott’, The American Conservative (Oct. 2009) 24, 25 (‘The idea of
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spects, England is the same nation as it was at the time of the first Elizabeth or the Glorious
Revolution. The Armada threatened to destroy the life of the nation, not by loss of life in battle,
but by subjecting English institutions to the rule of Spain and the Inquisition. The same was
true of the threat posed to the United Kingdom by Nazi Germany in the Second World War.
This country, more than any other in the world, has an unbroken history of living for centuries
under institutions and in accordance with values which show a recognisable continuity.44

So far, Bingham and Hoffmann’s respective views seem to reflect two competing conceptions
of authority. I would like to tie these differences now to a substantive question of law on
which they expressed widely divergent views, namely the scope of negligence liability of public authority. In an essay entitled ‘The Uses of Tort Law’ Bingham criticized the majority’s
view in Smith v Chief Constable of Sussex Police,45 a case in which a majority of the House of
Lords (against Bingham’s sole dissent) held that police forces owe no duty of care to individuals for failure to prevent them from being attacked, even when the individual provides the
police with specific information about the prospect of being subject to a violent attack by a
particular, identified, individual. Bingham concluded his essay with these words:
If the virtual immunity now extended by English law to large areas of police activity were removed, there would no doubt be a cost falling, directly or indirectly, on the community who
fund the service. If economy were all, the present law has its virtue. But if a member of the public whom a public service exists to serve suffers significant injury or loss through the culpable fault
or reprehensible failure of that service to act as it should, is it not consistent with ethical and,
perhaps, democratic principle that the many, responsible for funding the service, should bear
the cost of compensating the victim? I shall leave that as a rhetorical question, confident that
my own answer to it is clear.46

At almost the same time, Lord Hoffmann delivered the Bar Council Law Reform Lecture,
which dealt with the question of negligence liability of public authorities. In his lecture
Hoffmann stated:
Some people said that it was illogical that highway authorities should have what they called an
immunity from liability for non-repair. But that immunity was exactly the same as everyone else
had. No one owed a private law duty to repair the highway. The highway authority owed a pub-
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20

lic law duty to repair, but that, as a matter of ancient policy, was not enforceable in private
law.47

There is no way the difference between these two statements can be reconciled by context or
nuance. What Bingham called ‘virtual immunity’ enjoyed by the police, Hoffmann disparaged
as ‘what [some people] called an immunity’. These two statements reflect two divergent philosophies. Bingham’s claim is grounded in a particular view on the obligations a democratic
state owes its citizens. By contrast, Hoffmann adopts the libertarian view that treats the state
and police officers acting on its behalf as a kind of private actors. It is true that Hoffmann’s
concession with regard to the existence of a public law duty complicates the picture, but not
by much. By drawing the distinction Hoffmann affirms that members of the public do not
have a standing, as citizens, to demand that a public authority perform its duties and then
seek compensation when their failure leads to their injury. In this way he keeps the two
branches of law (and their underlying authorities) separate. This implies is a fundamentally
different view of the relationship between individuals and the state than Bingham’s.
Hoffmann’s suggestion that the state is treated just like any other person has a semblance
of neutrality: in the eyes of private law we are all equal. Except that, of course, it does not.
Parents are treated differently from others with regard to their children; employers are treated
differently from others with regard to their employees; doctors are treated differently from
others with regard to their patients. By treating the state in this context as a stranger, Hoffmann equates (for the purposes of tort law) public bodies’ provision of services to a stranger’s
act of charity.48
Do the differences on the proper place of European and comparative law in English law
and their different views on the question of the scope of tort liability of public authorities
have anything in common? Though it is difficult to answer this question with certitude, I believe the answer is ‘yes’. At one level, Bingham’s legal cosmopolitanism may have been influenced by the fact that the outcome he favoured was available in other jurisdictions. This is not
much of a speculation since Bingham surveyed the law regarding tort liability of public authorities in several common law and civil law jurisdictions and stated that Van Colle would
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have been decided differently ‘in most of the world’s leading jurisdictions’.49 Such a finding
can influence a judge in two ways. Factually, showing that liability has been imposed on the
police in other jurisdictions in similar circumstances provides some assurance that the legal
rule he proposed is not crazy and that it is unlikely to have seriously detrimental effects if
adopted. This may have been particularly important in the context of liability of public authorities, as a familiar argument for the restricting public authority liability is its potentially
deleterious effects.50 In this respect, legal decisions from other jurisdictions can serve as a
source of empirical data that may be more readily accessible to judges than more rigorous empirical studies. Normatively, Bingham’s openness to European law has led him to embrace the
view that common law duties should aim to correspond to human rights principles derived
from European jurisprudence, thus promoting greater convergence between English and European law.51
I think, however, that the link between Bingham’s views on legal convergence and his
views on the scope negligence liability of public authorities runs deeper than that. Bingham’s
basis for the imposition of liability in Smith rests on his conception of what the state owes
individuals and his views on European convergence stem from a single intellectual source:
universal human rights. In the context of liability of public authorities, it has led him to formulate a liability principle without which, he thought, the law ‘fails to perform the basic
function for which such a law exists’.52 And a fundamental function of that law—tort law—is
to protect human rights.53 As he put it, a democratic state that cares for human rights is obligated to the ‘democratic principle that the many, responsible for funding the service, should
bear the cost of compensating the victim’. This duty is very different from the duties that
oblige other individuals, and failure to maintain it can amount to a commission of a tort.
Hoffmann’s opposing substantive view is not simply based on the claim that the state is
treated the same as individuals. That, as we have seen, is a clearly unsatisfactory argument.
Once we acknowledge the significance he accords to the common law tradition, we can see a
more plausible explanation for his view. The deep thread Hoffmann finds in the common law
tradition—what he calls ‘the quintessentially British liberty’—is the negative liberty of protection from unlawful arrest. What he could not find in that tradition is the kind of relationship
between the state and its citizens (he calls them ‘subjects’) that underlies Bingham’s view.
What about the possible objection that the existence of an ancient British liberty does not
preclude the possibility of creating new duties derived from public law? To this Hoffmann
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replies, once again appealing to tradition, that it is ‘ancient wisdom’ that public law rights
cannot be the basis for private law remedies.

IV. The Future of a Common Law World
Earlier in this essay I attributed to the common law tradition view the idea that ‘common law
jurisdictions ought to converge by appeal to the normative force of commitment to a shared
tradition’. A crucial word here is ‘commitment’: a tradition requires a certain normative attitude that seeks its perpetuation. When this commitment is gone, a tradition can disintegrate
fairly quickly. Unlike the United States, which broke its ties with Britain from its inception,
the Commonwealth nations maintained close political and legal links with Britain, and they
also inherited the British political system of parliamentary supremacy and a more modest role
for popular sovereignty. In line with that political tradition, the tradition view of the common
law remained dominant, a fact that helps explain the continued commitment in these countries to maintaining common law convergence. And yet, in recent years we witness declining
convergence even there.54 In this section I try to explain why this process is taking place and
why it is likely to continue apace.
Contrary to Stevens’s view that ‘as common lawyers we are part of the same family
whether we like it or not’,55 my view is that within the tradition view convergence is the
product of more-or-less conscious decisions on the part of legal practitioners to maintain
commonality. When this effort disappears, two formerly close legal systems will tend naturally
to drift apart. This point is crucial to understanding the tradition view and for highlighting
another important contrast between it and the universalist view. Apart from the differences
mentioned earlier, these two views are likely to see the process of convergence as proceeding
according to a wholly different pattern. The universal view convergence can emerge ‘naturally’
as a result of two different jurisdictions identifying (possibly completely independently of
each other) the requirements of universal morality. After all, according to this view the requirements of morality are accessible to all rational creatures, and so a process of trial and error should eventually lead all legal systems to converge. An imperfect analogy is the biological
concept of convergent evolution, where two species develop similar traits independently of
each other because of similar evolutionary pressures. This view can see reason as imposing
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similar pressures on all humans, pressures that ultimately should lead their laws to converge.
(That this does not happen in reality is reason to doubt the veracity of this picture.)
This process is very different from the tradition view, where history and path dependence
are crucial for what counts as a right answer today, and therefore convergence is extremely
unlikely to emerge naturally. I will elaborate on this point with the aid of a simple model.
This model can be loosely analogized, once again borrowing from evolutionary biology, to
speciation, the process (or rather set of processes) by which a single species splits into two. On
the tradition view maintaining convergence requires an effort to master the legal materials of
more than one jurisdiction and guaranteeing that they proceed relatively in tandem. This is
because on this view there are no right answers in the abstract; rather, right answers to outstanding or novel legal questions emerge from past decisions. It follows from this point that
maintaining convergence between jurisdictions has costs, the most obvious being that doing
so requires attaining and mastering more legal materials that are less accessible. Historically,
part of the difficulty may have been simply physical: it was more difficult to have access to all
the law reports and academic commentary from another country. These days, when access to
legal materials from all over the world is much easier, the problem may be the opposite: the
ease of access to legal materials from all over the world results in an overwhelming glut that
discourages straying too far beyond one’s own jurisdiction. Either way, this cost is enough that
without effort small differences will tend to emerge between the two jurisdictions, and those
can fairly quickly become larger and therefore increasingly difficult to overcome. Once paths
begin to diverge, the costs of using legal materials from another jurisdiction increase, as that
jurisdiction begins to use different concepts, use similar words with somewhat different meaning, and develop the common law against a different statutory background. In this way small
differences grow bigger until use of materials from that jurisdiction becomes too costly to
bother.
At least when divergences are small, the costs of maintaining convergence may not overwhelming, and will be worth incurring when they are outweighed by the benefits of maintaining convergence. There are two typical types of case when this is likely to be the case: First,
when one legal system is young or small and as such lacking in sufficient case-law, which is
the central building block for the common law tradition; and second, when another legal system is considered superior in terms of its lawmakers’ (perceived) expertise. (Obviously, these
two scenarios are often, although not always, related.) But as legal systems mature, the benefits of convergence decline while the costs increase. Judges in the formerly ‘expert’ legal system
will no longer seem necessarily superior to the local judiciary, especially when it comes to local
conditions, in terms of both facts and values. And with a thicket of local legal materials increasing, keeping up with the materials of another jurisdiction will become more onerous and
seem less necessary. (Arguably, there is an optimal amount of cases to master and rationalize,
beyond which any effort to articulate a more-or-less coherent single tradition from the cases
becomes unwieldy and the tradition approach begins to break down. This may be one reason
for the decline of doctrinal scholarship in the United States.) A different cost to convergence
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is an inevitable result of the fact that the common law exists in an environment increasingly
more saturated with statute, and the common law must often be understood and interpreted
in relation to that legislation. Since legislators are much less concerned about maintaining
convergence, legislation is more likely to move in different directions in different countries,
based on the local needs and political forces. This will push the common law in different jurisdictions in different directions, making maintaining common law convergence more difficult. Doing so may appear elitist when doing so is preferred over solutions that seem to fit the
values of the particular community. Even from a more legal point of view, caring for common
law convergence may look like an ‘academic’ self-indulgence compared with maintaining internal coherence within each legal system between its judge-made and statutory law.
Another possible cost of maintaining convergence is that with growing maturity and expertise, the relationship between the two legal systems has to change from largely unidirectional (where one legal system is primarily a law-maker and another is primarily a law-taker)
to a reciprocal one. But lawyers in the formerly ‘superior’ legal system may not acquiesce to
their new lower status. This creates a problem, since without them agreeing to that, lawyers of
the formerly ‘receiving’ legal system will not see the situation as one of convergence, but rather as one in which they must accept and follow what is imposed from above (or outside).
And this will be perceived as an additional, possibly prohibitively hefty, cost. (Could this be
the reason why it is mostly English scholars who lament the decline of common law convergence while those from, say, Australia or Canada seem much less concerned about going their
own way?)
For these reasons, even within the tradition view, common law convergence will tend to
naturally decline with time unless it is vigilantly pursued. In fact, the tradition view may actually call for less convergence once two legal systems have begun charting their separate ways.
Once two legal systems have begun taking two different paths, the tradition view with the
premium it places on path dependence may call for keeping them to these paths rather than
attempting a precipitous shift toward another approach just for the sake of getting closer to a
solution adopted in another jurisdiction. As a result, the tradition view that in some cases
supports convergence, beyond a certain point can actually encourage divergence.
At a deeper level, there is, I think, a decline in the appeal of the tradition view itself. This
is a crucial point, because maintaining convergence is valuable only if one accepts the tradition
view of the authority of the common law. With different degrees of intensity, one finds the question ‘Why should our common law be grounded on the tradition model of authority?’ being
asked. Of course, the question is not rarely asked in quite this way, but in different formulations, it is asked at increasing frequency. As mentioned earlier, the tradition view of the common law depends on a perception of law as an autonomous discipline, of law as the generator
of normative requirements on the basis of careful elaboration of its own past materials, where
expertise consists of mastering the contents of countless court decisions. Though not completely obsolete, this idea is on the wane.
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One reason for that is that the tradition view is premised on the idea that the authority
of the common law derives from judges’ ability to discover in legal materials certain values
that run deep in a particular community. This view thus could avoid the puzzle of the authority of the common law by assuming both that judges are experts and that their expertise is of
value for determining the content of legal rules for a particular community. These days, both
assumptions look suspect. The first assumption has been affected by the many detailed studies
have suggested that the seemingly neutral, equal, common law has (perhaps completely innocuously) shown greater concern for the interests of certain groups rather than others, unsurprisingly the groups of those who belong to the elite that on the tradition view shape the
common law. As a result, even someone sympathetic to tradition as a source of authority
might not like the way the common law implements it. In response, the common has
changed in various ways to address this problem, although the extent of its success is, of
course, a controversial matter. The second concern is, I think, even more serious, as it touches
on the nature of lawyers’, especially judges’, alleged expertise. For the tradition-based approach
not only accepts but actually celebrates the common law’s separation from external standards.
The common law expert is someone who does not know much about the way the law actually
works in practice, and who has little ability to assess the potential effects of different rules.
Even more simply, the common law expert has relatively little knowledge on the extent to
which the common law adequately addresses actual concerns and needs of the population. It
is, for example, notable that the idea that sexual harassment or stalking should be treated as a
tort (a matter that in terms of numbers is potentially relevant to the lives of millions) did not
originate from doctrinal tort scholars, but exactly from those who adopted an ‘external’ or
critical perspective on the law. For what the common law considers expertise—great
knowledge of a mass of cases and the ability to work them out to a more-or-less coherent account of ‘the law’—can hardly help with addressing developing needs of society. (Could it be
that such considerations are judged as ‘external’ to the evaluation of the common law because
they are external to what the common law experts know?) Instead, the tradition-based approach suggests that the decision how certain areas of life should be structured is ideally to be
decided on nothing more than the primitive tools of the Talmudic scholar and the scholastic
student: mastery of past pronouncements made by people who are equally ignorant of the
law’s effects, and who focus their attention on the articulation of verbal formulae and ‘tests’
for identifying whether a new decision adequately follows past decisions or is properly ‘distinguishable’ from them. When stripped of its mysticism the tradition view can thus be seen as a
little more than seventeenth-century policy analysis.
It is this reality that has led to the narrowing down of the scope of decision-making given to this kind of expertise, as is evident from the decreasing significance of the common law.
In areas still governed by the common law, there have been various attempts to attempts to
change the common law in various ways that will give its decision-makers the tools to make
better-informed decisions. This process further weakens the hold of the appeal to the normative force of a historical tradition. Instead, judges are increasingly attempting to make deci-
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sions based more on an assessment of the contemporary needs of their particular society, taking also into account local cultural, social, political circumstances. And these, needless to say,
are not exactly to same across the common law world.
To be sure, England, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand are all democratic, developed
countries; but then so are Denmark and Japan. There might have been a time in the past
when, perhaps, one could speak of similarity in values between England and its former colonies (although I suspect that even then this was more an elite concern than something that
preoccupied the whole population), but with much immigration from non-English speaking
countries and the slow development of more uniquely local ways, it makes little sense to
maintain that Australian, Canadian, English (or is it British?), and New Zealand cultures are
all the same. These differences, even if not huge, can (and do) have an effect on the outcomes
of cases, especially contentious ones. Differences between common law countries are then
seen not as a cause for concern, but as a sign of independence.
Against all this, we can return to the questions posed in the beginning of this essay: Why
do some lawyers consider it more important that the tort law of England and Australia or the
contract law of Canada and New Zealand be similar than their constitutional law, their company law, or their labour law? Why, even though criminal law is (or used to be) part of the
‘common law’, there are no concerned voices about the fact that the criminal laws of different
common law countries may be different? I believe the way I set up the question helps identify
the answer. As far as I can see, maintaining common law convergence is important for those
who seek to maintain the tradition view of the common law itself (and along the way, validate
their own kind of expertise). What better proof could there be for the idea that the common
law is a matter of non-political expertise than the fact that politically independent states share
the same common law? Common law convergence is thus valued for proponents of the tradition view both for demonstrating the truth of this view, and for perpetuating it.
Common law convergence, however, is a rather weak reed for maintaining a view that is
independently unattractive. As we have seen, the common law convergence view is deeply
connected to the idea of law as an autonomous discipline, and this is a view held these days by
a shrinking minority. We know too much about the world to think that the path to improving the law exclusively, or even primarily, depends on analysing judges’ pronouncements. As a
result, the decline in commonality is both indicative of, and accelerates, the decline of the
theory of authority that values common law convergence and the autonomy of law, a process
which in turn weakens the hold of convergence even further.

V. Concluding Remarks
The last section should not be misunderstood. My claim is not that common lawyers should
not consider what happens in other countries; and if they do, it is more likely that they will
do so with courts from the rest of the English-speaking world. That is why what I said in this
essay should not be understood to mean that in fifty years’ time common law judges will no
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longer be able to understand each other’s judgments. If nothing else, there is no language barrier to overcome, and other non-legal links may keep common law jurisdictions somewhat
closer to each other than others. And in law, perhaps more than elsewhere, old habits die
hard. It is notable, however, that common lawyers care much less than they used to whether
their own legal system adopts the same solutions as other common law countries,56 and my
claim is that this trend will continue and probably intensify. My prediction is thus that most
Commonwealth lawyers will care about Commonwealth convergence the same way they feel
about maintaining convergence with American law, which means, not much.
More generally, this essay was motivated by an underlying normative claim. It is important to note that those who would like to maintain convergence in the common law are
really making a very narrow claim in two senses. They intend common law convergence to be
limited to a small list of legal areas, namely contract, tort, and restitution (even property law,
let alone criminal law or family, no longer look like obvious candidates for convergence); and
they intend it to a small subsection of common law countries, namely England, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This convergence is presented as required by nothing more than the
fact of a shared history (recall Stevens’s words: ‘as common lawyers we are part of the same
family whether we like it or not’) and it delivers precisely the kind of convergence that fits the
tradition view of common law authority and its supposedly non-political nature. What I have
sought to show is that this call for convergence is not free from politics. Indeed, Stevens himself has alluded to a more positive reason for maintaining common law convergence when he
said that ‘[t]he shape and nature of the common law has been determined by its method of
creation. Civil codes are the products of the choices of legislators, under the influence of legal
scholars, and it is unsurprising that the choice made differ in many respects from those of
judges, whose role and concerns are not the same.”57 This is partly true, but Stevens’s mistake,
like that of many other proponents of the tradition view, is to think that once a legal system
belongs to the common law, it must be understood and justified in terms of the tradition view
of authority. As I have attempted to show, this is not the case, and if the common law does
not interact with politics anywhere else, its underlying theory of authority is not politically
neutral, but one that has real-world, practical, implications.
The concluding section has made what may be understood as another prediction (or
perhaps just a bit of wishful thinking), and that is that the decline in convergence is part of a
decline of the tradition view itself, and that its decline may bring with it not just the dissolution of the idea of a common law world, but also the decline of the idea of the common law as
a decision procedure. If this is to happen, we will witness a decline in the view that mere mastery of past court decisions, together with some facility with language and informal logic, are
a good basis for adequately-regulating any aspect of human behavior. In medieval times this
was the method used because this was the only method available; this is no longer the case.
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That is why, even though the common law is still with us, it is far less important than it
used to be. Its marginalization is proof of the mistrust in this method of regulation and its
experts. Even where the common law governs a question, it is rarely left to its own devices and
is virtually everywhere accompanied by extensive legislative regulation. With regard to those
decisions still given to judges, there is growing awareness on part of the judges that they
should base their decisions on the scope of the legal rules they adopt on better information on
the social effects of their choices. Many proponents of the common law method resist this
move making the point that judges do not have the necessary knowledge or ability to assess
questions of social policy. But since such considerations are clearly relevant for deciding such
questions, if it is indeed the case that judges cannot evaluate them, the sensible solution is not
to remove the considerations for the decision-making process, but to remove the judges from it.
The prevalence of regulation is proof that this is in fact the solution that has been adopted in
countless of contexts. One implication of the argument in this essay is that this process cannot
be separated from the decline in common law convergence.
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